WEBINAR

Implementing the 5 Pillars of IT Security for MQTT

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WELCOME



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As we speak millions of things are newly connected to the internet

The Internet of Things is HUGE

DEVICES ON THE INTERNET





Web Technology used today is built for the Internet of Humans,

NOT for the **Internet of Things**



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Technical IoT Challenges



- Scalability: Massive scalability required for millions of devices
- Instant data delivery: critical systems need reliable and instant data transfer
- Unreliable networks: excellent customer experience for IoT apps and devices



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We need **open standards** designed for the **Internet of Things**

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AT DESCRIPTION

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What is MQTT?



- (I)IoT Messaging Protocol
- Created for extreme scale and instant data exchange
- Publish/Subscribe based architecture
- Easy on the device side, pushes all implementation complexity to the server
- Built for machines and constrained devices (binary, data agnostic)
- Designed for reliable communication over unreliable channels











MQTT Use Cases



Push Communication

Reliable Communication over unreliable networks

Constrained Devices

Low Bandwidth and High Latency

Industrial Message Bus





- Lightweight protocol on top of TCP/IP
- Publish / Subscribe pattern using topics
- De-coupling of sender and receiver





Security Challenges for IoT Use Cases



Challenge 1 - Sensible Data



Connecting things exposes sensible data to the internet

• Data breach would damage the reputation of your business

Bad press can ruin your business (unit)



Challenge 2 - Control over IoT Devices



- Compromised devices for daily usage can be extremely dangerous
 - --- Attacker could get control over device
- Compromised devices can open access to company infrastructure
 - Point of entry for fraudsters to steal corporate secrets



Challenge 3 - Legal or Corporate Regulations



- Legal regulations for data privacy and safety
 - Software must be compliant to a bunch
 - of legal regulations like GDPR, CCPA, ...

Corporate compliance policies

In addition software must be compliant to corporate specific regulations



Challenge 4 - Customer Experience



- Customer experience for IoT apps and devices must be excellent even when security is in place
 - Combination of high grade security and excellent user experience
- Devices and apps must be easy to program and maintain, complexity should be at the broker not on the device
 - → Broker is easier to update than physical devices







Security is a key concern for any application



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Multiple Security Layers





5 pillars of IT Security



5 Pillars of IT Security





Confidentiality

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Confidentiality

Information is only **available to authorized parties** (and to no one else)

- This is the thing we most often care about.
- We don't want competitors to get our data.
- We don't want to be liable for data loss (GDPR).
- We want to validate the trust placed in us by our customers.



Confidentiality



- Trusted environments
- Transport encryption
- Mutual Authentication
- Subscriber Authorization



Trusted Environments



- Run broker and devices in trusted environments
- Broker often works as interface between public untrusted environment and secure backend
- If devices are not under your control, don't trust them unconditionally





Transport Encryption



- MQTT is based on **TCP / IP Stack**
- Listens on **Port 1883** for communication

- TCP connection can be secured by TLS
- Listens on **Port 8883** for secure communication





TLS - Transport Layer Security

Cryptographic protocol

Secure communication and authenticated channel between server and clients

TLS Handshake initiates TLS session

TLS secured communication can't be eavesdropped by anyone

Prevents Man-in-the-Middle attacks



Provision and Revocation of Certificates



Provision of certificates

- Needs a planned provisioning and certificate lifecycle process
- Deployed PKI (public key infrastructure)

Revocation of certificates

- Needed as soon as certificates can't be trusted anymore
- Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
- OCSP for online certificate validation
- Use a management system like Hashicorp Vault



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Transport Encryption - Best Practices



- Use transport encryption (TLS)
- Use certificates from trusted CAs
- Use highest TLS version and secure cipher suites



Cipher Suites

$\texttt{TLS}_\texttt{AES}_\texttt{256}_\texttt{GCM}_\texttt{SHA384}$

- High bit length (big numbers)
- Proven Algorithms (AES)
- Safe Modes (GCM)

For TLS <= 1.2

• Ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange (e.g. TLS_ECDHE_...)





Transport Encryption - Example

tcp.port == 1883 or tcp.port	== 8883					8 - +
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175 48.090025	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TLSv1.2		100 Application Data	
176 48.090041	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP		56 8883 → 56064 [ACK] Seq=3816 Ack=443 Win=407808 Len=0 TSval=1324927584 TSecr=1324927584	
177 48.102434	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TLSv1.2		91 Application Data	
178 48.102481	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP		56 56064 - 8883 [ACK] Seq=443 Ack=3851 Win=404416 Len=0 TSval=1324927596 TSecr=1324927596	
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Payload Encryption

On very constrained devices transport encryption could be not possible!

- Use payload encryption instead
- At least hash or encrypt password of connecting client
- Every clients needs to have key & secret
- BUT!: It leaks metadata



Mutual Authentication

Authentication verifies whether a person, device or application is who they say they are



Authentication can take place on the Transport Layer and on the Application Layer





Mutual Authentication using Certificates



Transport Layer Authentication

- Mutual Authentication of broker and client using the presented certificate at TLS handshake
- Authentication takes place **before a secure communication channel is established**

Application Layer Authentication / Authorization

Client is granted permissions based on certificate information





Client Authentication (Identity and Access Management Systems)

MQTT-Packet: CONNECT	٥
contains:	Example
clientId	"client-1"
cleanSession	true
username (optional)	"hans"
password (optional)	"letmein"
lastWillTopic (optional)	"/hans/will"
lastWillQos (optional)	2
lastWillMessage (optional)	"unexpected exit"
lastWillRetain (optional)	false
keepAlive	60

Caution:

Not all brokers support a pluggable authentication and authorization system!

- Different **external systems** can be used to authenticate clients at a broker
- Client provides authentication data in the CONNECT packet
- Broker **looks up the authentication data** in the connected external systems
- External authentication systems:
 - LDAP
 - o OAuth2.0
 - Databases
 - ACL
 - o ...



Mutual Authentication - Example





Subscriber Authorization

Authorization provides access rights to a resource

- Without authorization every client is allowed to subscribe to all topics
- Clients should only get the data they are allowed to get
- Permission structure must match topic structure
- Tip: Use client identifiers in topics where possible
- Be careful with wildcard subscriptions!





Subscriber Authorization

Permission includes:

- Allowed **Topic** (exact topic or topic filter including wildcards)
- Allowed **Operation** (Subscribe, Publish, both)
- Allowed **QoS** (0, 1, 2, 0-1, 1-2, all)
- Allowed specific operations (retained messages, shared subscriptions)





Integrity

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Integrity

Information can only be **put into the system or changed by authorized parties** (and no one else)

- Devices make decisions based on data.
- Customers expect correct data.
- Deployment teams take actions based on data.







- Transport Encryption
- Mutual Authentication
- Publisher Authorization
- Broker / Device access security



Publisher Authorization

S Blocklist

- Everything that is not explicitly denied, is allowed
- Offers protection as long as all restrictions are known for all clients
- Threats are only stopped after list has been updated

-☆- Whitelist

- Everything that is not explicitly allowed, is denied
- High maintenance effort
- Access is only granted after list has been updated



Authorization of Publishers - Example





Access Security (Operating System)

- Keep libraries and software updated
- Every connection should pass at least one Firewall
- Disallow root access and use SSH keys for SSH
- Use file system permissions (chmod -R X00 ...)
- Install a intrusion detection and prevention system
- Use SELinuX



Access Security (Tamper proofing devices)

- Remove JTAG access
- Use signed firmware
- Secure access to X.509 Certificates (read only)
- Endpoint Security

• ...



Availability

Availability

The system can be **accessed by authorized parties at any time**

• Excursion: A cautious tale of the most secure

software system.

- Only a used system generates any value
- Customers pay for the availability of a system



Availability



- MQTT software selection
- Incident management
- Support systems



Criteria for selecting the right MQTT Broker

- Performant, scalable and high available broker
- Track Record and Reputation of the broker vendor
- Longevity: Long Term Support for broker software
- Compliance to the entire MQTT specification
- Monitoring of broker and tracing of devices
- Pluggable authentication & authorization system
- (D)DoS Detection
- Overload Protection
- Support of TLS
- Professional support







BRabbitMO



Overload Protection - Example





Criteria for selecting the right MQTT Client

- Efficient and reliable implementation of the whole standard
- Supports all MQTT security features
- Longevity: Long Term Support for client software







Criteria for selecting the right Integration Systems

- Highly proven and production grade third party systems
- Track Record and Reputation of the vendor
- Longevity: Long Term Support for software





Incident Management



Clear responsibilities for incident management inside your organisation

Defined processes with a multi tiered escalation

Direct access to subject matter experts via vendor support contracts.

Regular trainings and rehearsals





High skill level of responsible team

Regular Backups of the system



Support Systems



Load Balancers

Scalable Infrastructure

Automated monitoring and flexible logging handling



Alerting Systems

IDS / IPS System with the right data source (Access Log, ip based)



Other Pillars



Authenticity

Information is associated with a source

-> Payload Signing



Non-Repudiation

Actions is associated with a source after the fact

-> Audit Log

Auditability

The system generates and stores a paper trail

-> Access Log

Privacy

Personal data is not leaked

-> Must be implemented in the infrastructure





Security is a **key concern** for any IoT application. HiveMQ implements the security features required for safe and secure enterprise IT and OT deployments.



HiveMQ Security Architecture





HiveMQ Security Architecture



- Pluggable Authentication and Authorization System
- Prebuilt Security Extension

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- TLS secured communication
- Overload Protection and (D)DOS detection
- Fine grained permission system for MQTT clients and HiveMQ Control Center users
- Chaining of auth mechanisms
- Default Deny-All behaviour
- Integrated monitoring system and over 800 metrics
- 24/7 professional support



HiveMQ Enterprise Security Extension



- Central management for IoT device and HiveMQ Control Center authentication and authorization
- Flexible and easy integration with multiple external authentication systems and data sources (e.g. databases, LDAP, OAuth 2.0)
- High Scalability and reliability
- Default Whitelisting Concept
- Access log (rolling on daily basis)
- Provides maximum flexibility in defining authorization rules



ANY QUESTIONS?

Reach out to community.hivemq.com



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